Gibbons Law Alert

Gibbons Law Alert Blog

Second Circuit Reverses Award of Summary Judgment in Price-Fixing Action, Based on Clarification of Matsushita and Examination of Antitrust Causation

On August 23, 2012

On August 6, 2012, ten days after the Third Circuit issued its opinion in Superior Offshore International, Inc. v. Bristow Group, Inc. — the subject of a prior blog entry — the Second Circuit decided In re Publication Paper Antitrust Litigation, which sheds additional light on the proof required to sustain a claim for horizontal price-fixing under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Recognizing, but not relying on, the evidentiary distinction between direct and circumstantial evidence discussed in Superior Offshore International, the Court instead assessed the totality of the evidence to determine whether it supported a reasonable inference of an illegal agreement. Importantly, the Court made clear that although an antitrust plaintiff must point to record evidence giving rise to such an inference in order to defeat summary judgment, it need not also disprove the possibility of non-conspiratorial conduct. In addition, the Court held, a plaintiff must show that the illegal agreement was both a material and a but-for cause of the alleged price increase.

FTC Proposes Rules to Codify Reporting of Exclusive Patent Right Transfers in the Pharmaceutical Industry

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Patent / Pharmaceuticals

On August 21, 2012

Is the sale or assignment of a patent reportable? The Hart-Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act of 1976 (“HSR”) and related rules require that all acquisitions of voting securities or assets exceeding a threshold amount be reported to the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), as well as the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. The current threshold is $68.2 million.

Wrigley v. Cadbury: Judge Newman Emphasizes Commercial Success and Copying

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Patent

On August 17, 2012

In WM. Wrigley Jr. v. Cadbury Adams USA, a recent Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit decision related to chewing gum patents, Wrigley brought suit against Cadbury for infringement of its U.S. Patent Number 6,627,233 (“the ‘233 patent”) claiming a chewing gum including a combination of menthol and a physiological cooling agent, WS-23. Cadbury counterclaimed against Wrigley for infringement of Cadbury’s U.S. Patent Number 5,009,893 (“the ‘893 patent”) claiming a chewing gum including menthol and a similar cooling agent entitled WS-3.

NY Court Likens Tweeting to “Screaming Out a Window” and Denies Twitter’s Motion to Quash in Harris

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in E-Discovery: Legal Decisions and Court Rules

On August 17, 2012

We previously reported on the New York District Attorney’s attempts to obtain tweets by a criminal defendant in People of the State of New York v. Harris, Index No. 080152/2011 on May 23, 2012 and the corresponding challenges asserted by the individual user/defendant and Twitter itself on June 7, 2012. The Court first denied defendant’s motion to quash the subpoena served on the social networking site Twitter, ruling that the defendant, charged with disorderly conduct after allegedly marching onto the Brooklyn Bridge during an Occupy Wall Street protest, had no reasonable expectation of privacy in communications of this type and lacked standing to seek the protections of the Stored Communications Act. Seeing its user fail in his efforts to quash the subpoena, Twitter took the matter into its own hands, moving for the same relief as defendant and ultimately obtaining the same result. The more recent decision, which addressed Twitter’s challenges, raised considerable buzz in legal and social media circles as a case of first impression because it concerned (1) a criminal rather than a civil matter and (2) a motion by a social media site rather than an individual user.

Gibbons Real Property & Environmental Team Members Contribute Chapter in Brownfields Publication

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Environmental and Green Issues

On August 15, 2012

David A. Brooks and Paul M. Hauge, both members of the Gibbons Real Property & Environmental Department, contributed a chapter in Implementing Institutional Controls at Brownfields and Other Contaminated Sites. Edward F. McTiernan, Deputy Counsel with the New York Department of Environmental Conservation, co-authored the chapter with Mr. Brooks and Mr. Hauge.

The Open Public Meetings Act and the Board of Governors of Rutgers

by Thomas J. Cafferty

Posted in General Litigation

On August 15, 2012

On July 25, 2012, the New Jersey Supreme Court decided McGovern v. Rutgers. The Court’s ruling — which found violations of Open Public Meetings Act, N.J.S.A. 10:4-6 et seq. (“OPMA”), but no statutory remedy — highlights the need for an amendment to OPMA providing effective remedies for violations of OPMA.

(Still) Waiting for Akamai and McKesson ….

by Thomas J. Bean

Posted in Patent

On August 15, 2012

As the summer rolls along, IP practitioners still await the Federal Circuit’s decisions in the en banc rehearings of Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010) and McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011), which will address liability among multiple step performers accused of patent infringement.

New Amendments to New Jersey Court Rules Will Make Orders Denying Arbitration Immediately Appealable

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Appellate

On August 13, 2012

The amended Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey will take effect on September 4, 2012. Among the more important amendments are those concerning a party’s ability to appeal an arbitration order. Typically, only final orders that conclude a litigation as to all parties and all issues are immediately appealable. But, as a result of amendments made in 2010, the current version of Rule 2:2-3(a) expands the notion of a final order in the context of orders compelling arbitration, providing that “an order compelling arbitration, whether the action is dismissed or stayed, shall also be deemed a final judgment of the Court for appeal purposes.” The New Jersey Supreme Court in GMAC v. Pittella, 205 N.J. 572 (2011), expanded that Rule still further by holding that “orders compelling or denying arbitration are deemed final and appealable as of right as of the date entered.” To implement that decision, Rule 2:2-3(a) has been amended to state that “any order either compelling arbitration, whether the action is dismissed or stayed, or denying arbitration shall also be deemed a final judgment of the Court for appeal purposes.” An amendment to Rule 2:9-1(a) will permit the Trial Court to retain jurisdiction, pending appeal, over other parties and claims that remain in that court.

Third Circuit Rules That Employers Need Not Accommodate Work Restrictions at End of FMLA Leave

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Family Leave

On August 9, 2012

Are employers required to provide reasonable accommodations to an employee to facilitate his or her return to the same or equivalent position at the conclusion of an FMLA leave? According to a recent decision from the Third Circuit Court of Appeals, the answer is no, provided the employee is unable to perform the essential functions of his job position. The case, Macfarlan v. Ivy Hill, provides important guidance for employers who must make such determinations upon an employee’s return from FMLA-protected leave.

United States District Court for the District of New Jersey Finds Franchisee’s Felony Conviction is Not a Valid Basis for Immediate Termination of a Franchise Agreement Under the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act When the Crime is Not “Directly Related to the Business Conducted Pursuant to the Franchise”

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in General Litigation

On August 9, 2012

All franchisors and distributors should be aware of a June 27, 2012, decision in which the United States District Court for the District of New Jersey reaffirmed the New Jersey Franchise Practices Act’s (“FPA”) strong policy of protecting the rights of franchisees and limiting a franchisor’s ability to terminate a franchise agreement without first providing 60 days written notice — even in the face of a franchisee’s felony conviction — so long as that conviction is not “directly related to the business conducted pursuant to the Franchise.” In International House of Pancakes, LLC, et al. v. Parsippany Pancake House Inc., Civil Action No. 12-03307 (WJM) (MF), the District Court denied International House of Pancakes’ (“IHOP”) request for a preliminary injunction enforcing IHOP’s termination of Defendant Parsippany Pancake House, Inc.’s (“Pancake House”) franchise and prohibiting Pancake House from continued use of IHOP’s logos and other marks. IHOP terminated the franchise, effective immediately, after learning that Pancake House’s president and majority owner pleaded guilty to the crime of endangering the welfare of a minor, and admitted during his plea hearing to having engaged in sexual conduct with a minor, a felony. IHOP ended Pancake House’s franchise based upon language in the franchise agreement providing for immediate termination if the franchisee is convicted a felony. Pancake House countered that the...