Gibbons Law Alert

Gibbons Law Alert Blog

Ninth Circuit Adopts Expansive Definition of Autodialer Under the TCPA, Creating Circuit Split With Third Circuit

On September 24, 2018

In Marks v. Crunch San Diego, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, considering anew the statutory definition of automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), held that an ATDS includes a device that stores telephone numbers to be called, “whether or not those numbers have been generated by a random or sequential number generator.” The Ninth Circuit expressly declined to follow the Third Circuit’s interpretation of ATDS in Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., thus setting up a clear Circuit split. Both Marks and Dominguez were issued after the D.C. Circuit invalidated the FCC’s interpretation of ATDS in ACA International v. Federal Communications Commission. In Marks, plaintiff brought a TCPA class action after receiving three text messages from Crunch Fitness where he had a gym membership, asserting that the texts were sent using an ATDS. The messaging system was a “web-based marketing platform designed to send promotional text messages to a list of stored telephone numbers.” Phone numbers were either manually entered into the system or provided directly by customers. To send text campaigns, a Crunch employee would log in, select the intended recipients, generate the content of a message, and select the time and date for the transmittal of the text messages. The district court granted summary judgment on the ground...

New Jersey Appellate Division Finds Individual Causation Issues Related to Ascertainable Loss Detrimental to Class Certification

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Class Action Defense

On September 21, 2018

In Polanco v. Star Career Academy, the New Jersey Appellate Division vacated a $10.7 million final verdict against Star Career Academy (“Star”), a New Jersey for-profit school. At issue in the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act (“CFA”) class action trial below was whether Star concealed and failed to disclose necessary information to Surgical Technology (“ST”) program applicants and students. Specifically, it was alleged that the school did not have the required accreditation needed for students to gain employment upon graduation. Trial resulted in a verdict against Star in the amount of $9 million, with a $1.7 million fee award. On appeal, the appellate panel first found that students seeking an education from a school like Star have the right to know, before enrollment, whether the school has proper accreditation. This is to afford students the opportunity to attend an accredited institution instead. The panel found that because the record contained evidence that Star had made material misrepresentations to students regarding the lack of proper accreditation, Star’s pre-trial summary judgment motion had properly been denied. However, the appellate panel concluded that the trial court had improperly certified the class because the class-wide claims did not predominate over individual allegations by the class members for the following reasons: First, there was a “disparate series of alleged misrepresentations,”...

New Fair Credit Reporting Act – Summary of Rights Forms

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Policies and Handbooks / Privacy and Data Security

On September 21, 2018

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), the Federal agency that administers the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), just issued new Summary of Rights forms. An employer conducting a background check on an employee or applicant through a consumer reporting agency must provide such employee or applicant a Summary of Rights notice when first obtaining consent to conduct the background check — together with a written disclosure about the use of the background check — and when taking adverse action based on the background check. Starting today, September 21, 2018, the new Summary of Rights form must be used. The CFPB also issued forms called Summary of Consumer Identity Theft Rights that must be provided to consumers by credit reporting agencies when the subject of an identity theft. A new law also requires credit reporting agencies to implement a “national security freeze” at no cost to a consumer that restricts prospective lenders from access to a consumer’s credit report. Other changes include a one year (instead of 90 days) notification of a fraud alert in a consumer’s file. The notification informs a lender that the consumer may have been the victim of identity theft, for which the lender must take additional steps to verify the identity of anyone attempting to obtain credit in the consumer’s name....

N.J. Appellate Division: Both Parties Were Ineligible for Public Entity Cleanup Grant Where Private Party Conducting Remediation for County’s Benefit Was Not County’s Redeveloper or Agent

by Paul M. Hauge

Posted in Environmental and Green Issues

On September 14, 2018

For purposes of obtaining financial assistance from the State, cleaning up environmental contamination for a governmental body’s benefit is not the same as cleaning it up on behalf of the government as its formal designee. That is the hard lesson that a former landowner learned in the New Jersey Appellate Division’s August 29, 2018 decision in In re Hazardous Discharge Site Remediation Fund Public Entity Grant Application for Remedial Investigation and Remedial Action. When Barry Rosengarten contracted to sell a parcel of land in Perth Amboy to Middlesex County for use as open space, he agreed to remediate environmental contamination, and the County escrowed monies from the sale to be released to Mr. Rosengarten as he performed the cleanup. The County also agreed to cooperate in seeking State grants that could offset those costs and thus reduce Mr. Rosengarten’s net cleanup expenses. Through Mr. Rosengarten’s counsel, the County applied to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) for either a Brownfield Development Area Grant or a 75% Recreation and Conservation Grant. NJDEP denied the application after finding that the County was not performing the cleanup and that the contract did not provide that Mr. Rosengarten was doing the work on the County’s behalf. On Mr. Rosengarten’s appeal, after initially holding that Mr. Rosengarten had...

Federal Circuit Affirms PTAB Finding That CRISPR-Cas9 Inventions Are Patentably Distinct

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Biotech / Patent / USPTO

On September 12, 2018

The Federal Circuit in Regents of the University of California v. The Broad Institute weighed in on the disputed inventorship of the breakthrough CRISPR-Cas9 technology, holding that the University of California (“UC”)’s invention of the mechanism in vitro did not render obvious Broad’s claims to the mechanism in eukaryotic cells. Gibbons previously reported on the technical background of CRISPR-Cas9. This post will focus on the inventorship issue and the implications of the Federal Circuit decision. In August 2012, UC researchers published an article showing that the CRISPR-Cas9 system, derived from prokaryotic cells like bacteria, could be used in vitro in a non-cellular experimental environment. Several research groups independently applied CRISPR-Cas9 in eukaryotic cells within months of UC’s disclosure. In February 2013, Broad researchers published an article describing the use of CRISPR-Cas9 in a human cell line. Both UC and Broad sought patent protection. UC, the senior party, claims the CRISPR-Cas system without referring to a particular cell type or environment. Broad, the junior party, claims the CRISPR-Cas system limited to use in eukaryotic cells, i.e., plant and animal cells. The Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) determined there was no interference-in-fact because, given the differences between eukaryotic and prokaryotic systems, a person of ordinary skill in the art would not have had a reasonable expectation of success...

New York Employers Fall Review

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Policies and Handbooks

On September 6, 2018

In 2018, employers in New York encountered several important changes, including in the areas of anti-harassment and scheduling, warranting a Fall review of current employment practices and preparation for next year’s developments. Employers should take the time now to review current practices and prepare for the imminent future. NEW YORK CITY’S TEMPORARY SCHEDULE CHANGE LAW New York City’s Temporary Schedule Change Law (“TSC Law”) became effective July 18, 2018, and requires private employers to provide eligible employees with an allowance of a “temporary change” to their usual work schedule for certain qualifying “personal events” for up to two occasions per year (i.e., one business day twice per year or two business days on one occasion). Eligible employees are those who work at least 80 hours a year in New York City and have been employed by their employer for 120 or more days, with limited exceptions, including employees covered by collective bargaining agreements waiving the law. Temporary schedule changes may include paid time off, use of short-term unpaid leave, permission to work remotely, or working hour swaps or shifts. Qualifying “personal events” include: (a) an employee’s need to: (i) care for a minor child or care recipient (i.e., a person with a disability who is a family or household member and relies on the employee...

Qualified Opportunity Zones – Waiting for Guidance

by Peter J. Ulrich

Posted in State Legislation / State Legislative and Budget Matters

On September 6, 2018

As part of the comprehensive 2017 Tax Reform, Congress enacted a set of provisions originally introduced in the Investing in Opportunity Act. These provisions present investors with an entirely new taxpayer-friendly investment vehicle. Rolling over the gain proceeds from the sale of any property, presumably including stock or real estate (the “initial property”), into an investment in a qualified opportunity zone (“QOZ”) offers investors the chance to defer and reduce capital gains on that initial sale, and achieve a subsequent tax-free exit from the QOZ investment. Tax Benefits Again, the tax benefits start with a deferral of gain on the current sale of the initial property until December 31, 2026 if the gain proceeds from that initial sale are invested within 180 days in a Qualified Opportunity Zone Fund (“QOF”), or until the investor exits the QOF (if before December 31, 2026). If the proceeds remain in the QOF for at least five years, the basis of the investment is increased by 10% (which will reduce taxes by 10% on the gain from the sale of such initial property). If the proceeds are kept in a QOF for at least seven years, the basis is increased an additional 5%, providing an investor with a total tax savings of 15%. Critically, December 31, 2026 is a...

Patent Infringement Defendants’ Attempt to Transfer Venue Thwarted

by Charles H. Chevalier and Christine A. Gaddis

Posted in Patent / Pharmaceuticals

On September 5, 2018

In federal cases, venue transfer is permitted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), “[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice . . . to any other district or division where it might have been brought or to any district or division to which all parties have consented.” The defendants in a patent infringement case venued in the District of New Jersey recently failed in their attempt to transfer venue of their cases to the District of Delaware pursuant to § 1404(a). The cases involve the alleged infringement of a patent that covers Suboxone sublingual film for the treatment of opioid dependence. The defendants argued that venue transfer was appropriate based on their consent to venue in Delaware, the discretionary factors outlined in Jumara v. State Farm Insurance, 55 F.3d 873 (3d Cir. 1995), and the first-filed rule. None of these arguments proved successful, as the magistrate judge issued reports and recommendations denying the motions of defendants Dr. Reddy’s, Teva, and Alvogen Pine Brook. And, the district judge affirmed and adopted the magistrate judge’s opinions. After first concluding that venue for the cases was proper in the District of New Jersey pursuant to the patent venue statue, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the court turned to the defendants’ arguments for transfer. With respect...

Using IPR To Trigger Prosecution Disclaimer

by Wendy R. Stein

Posted in Patent

On August 24, 2018

A recent district court decision found prosecution disclaimer stemming from statements by a patentee distinguishing its inventions from the prior art when opposing inter partes review. See Game & Tech. Co. v. Blizzard Entm’t, Inc., 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58424 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 4, 2018). As alleged infringers are increasingly filing petitions for inter partes review of patents asserted against them, the case illustrates how to use statements made by a patentee to oppose inter partes review against them in a related district court patent litigation. In Blizzard Entm’t, Game and Technology Co. Ltd. (GTCO) sued the defendant game developer, alleging that the defendant’s manufacture, sale, and distribution of online games infringed three patents: U.S. Patent No. 8,035,649, 8,253,743, and 7,682,243. After the Court transferred the case from the Eastern District of Texas to the Central District of California, the defendant petitioned for IPR of all patents-in-suit and moved to stay the action pending inter partes review. The Court stayed the case pending inter partes review. In March 2018, the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB) issued a decision concerning the ‘743 patent, finding all claims unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 103. As to the ‘649 and ‘243 patents however, the PTAB denied institution of an IPR in February and March 2017, respectively. Nevertheless, the...

What is “A Regular and Established Place of Business”?: A Case Compendium

by Charles H. Chevalier

Posted in Patent

On August 22, 2018

Since the TC Heartland decision in which the Supreme Court ruled that the “residence” prong in the patent venue statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), refers only to the state of incorporation and not the definition conferred in the general venue statute, § 1391, parties and courts have focused attention on interpreting the alternative basis for venue under the statute: “where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place of business.” TC Heartland v. Kraft Foods Group Brands, 137 S. Ct. 1514, 1516 (2017). Of particular interest is how courts have ruled on what constitutes “a regular and established place of business.” In September 2017, the Federal Circuit clarified that a “regular and established place of business” must meet three general requirements: “(1) there must be a physical place in the district; (2) it must be a regular and established place of business; and (3) it must be the place of the defendant.” In re Cray, 871 F.3d 1355, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2017). First, there must be a “physical place,” i.e., a “physical, geographical location in the district from which the business of the defendant is carried out.” Id. at 1362. The Court defined a physical place as a “building or part of a building set apart for any purpose.”...