Gibbons Law Alert

Post-Alice Plaintiffs Beware: The Northern District of California Awards Attorneys’ Fees in Exceptional Case

by Charles H. Chevalier and Christine A. Gaddis

Posted in Patent

On July 17, 2018

Abstract ideas are not patentable pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 101. And, in Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014) the Supreme Court set forth a framework to determine whether a patent is directed to an unpatentable abstract idea. Following Alice, defendants frequently move to dismiss patent infringement actions based on Section 101. That is exactly what recently happened in Cellspin Soft, Inc., v. Fitbit, Inc. in the Northern District of California. In that case, the 14 defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss pursuant to Section 101, arguing that the patents were directed to the “abstract concept” of acquiring, transferring, and publishing data and that the claims recited only “generic computer technology” to carry out the abstract idea, and thus lacked a requisite “transformative step” which would render the abstract idea patentable. The District Court agreed and entered judgment in the defendants’ favor. Following their successful motion to dismiss, the defendants moved, again successfully, for attorneys’ fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285. In patent infringement actions, courts have discretion, pursuant to Section 285, to award attorneys’ fees in an “exceptional case.” And, the district court found that the Cellspin case was just that. In considering the defendants’ motion for fees, the district court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s claims lacked...

Wrap-Up of United States Supreme Court’s 2017-2018 Term

by Christopher Walsh and Kevin R. Reich

Posted in General Litigation

On July 11, 2018

With the close of the United States Supreme Court’s 2017-18 term, we offer this wrap-up, focusing on decisions of special interest from the business and commercial perspective (excluding patent cases): In a much talked-about decision in the antitrust field, the Court held in Ohio v. American Express Co. that American Express’s anti-steering provisions in its merchant contracts, which generally preclude merchants from encouraging customers to use credit cards other than American Express, are not anticompetitive and therefore do not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In so holding, the Court found that credit card networks are two-sided transaction platforms, one side being the merchant and the other side being the merchant’s customer. Thus, when assessing whether the anti-steering agreements are anticompetitive, the effects on both sides of the platform must be considered. The plaintiffs’ proof that American Express had increased its merchant fees over a period of time was insufficient to show an anticompetitive effect because it neglected the customer side of the platform, where consumers have received the benefit of ever-increasing rewards from credit card companies and other improvements in services that those higher merchant fees enable. Bringing an end to a fight that New Jersey had been waging against the NCAA and professional sports leagues since 2012, the Court paved the way for...

Tax Changes Funding New Jersey’s New 2019 Budget

by Peter J. Ulrich

Posted in State Legislation / State Legislative and Budget Matters

On July 6, 2018

This past weekend, Governor Phil Murphy and the New Jersey legislature avoided a government shutdown by agreeing to a $37.4 billion compromise budget deal, which included significant changes to New Jersey’s business and individual taxes, including: A new “millionaire’s tax” on individuals earning $5 million or more increasing the top marginal Gross Income Tax (“GIT”) rate from 8.97% to 10.75% Business taxpayers with NJ allocated income in excess of $1 million will be liable for a 2.5% surtax (on top of the current 9% rate) for the next two years, with the surtax reduced to 1.5% for the following two years The new federal pass-through business income deduction (IRC Section 199A) will be unavailable for Corporation Business Tax (“CBT”) or GIT purposes; other decoupling provisions were adopted For CBT apportionment purposes, sales of services will be sourced to New Jersey if, or to the extent that, the benefit of the service is received at a location in New Jersey Additional legislation to expand the reach of the sales and use tax to remote sellers in light of the recent Supreme Court ruling in Wayfair v. South Dakota is awaiting the Governor’s signature Mandatory unitary combined reporting under the CBT is now required, effective for tax years beginning on or after January 1, 2019; these rules...

SCOTUS to Have the Last Word on “Wholly Groundless” Standard for Delegation of Arbitrability

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in General Litigation

On July 6, 2018

If the parties to an arbitration agreement have agreed that an arbitrator should decide whether a dispute is arbitrable, the question of arbitrability should be decided by an arbitrator. But who should decide arbitrability when the suggestion of arbitrability is so frivolous as to be wholly groundless? Should the party resisting arbitration be required to arbitrate arbitrability before seeking judicial relief? The United States Supreme Court will soon decide. According to the United States Supreme Court, questions of arbitrability are “undeniably . . . issues for judicial determination”—“unless the parties clearly and unmistakably provide otherwise.” Thus, when contracting parties have clearly and unmistakably agreed that an arbitrator must decide questions of arbitrability, the parties’ dispute should be sent to an arbitrator in the first instance to determine whether the dispute is arbitrable. Some circuits, however, provide exception to this rule where the argument for arbitrability is “wholly groundless.” In such instances, the parties’ dispute can proceed directly to court without a stop at an arbitrator’s desk. The Fifth Circuit initially adopted this rule in Douglas v. Regions Bank, and most recently applied it in Archer and White Sales Inc. v. Henry Schein, Inc. In Archer, a dental-equipment distributor sued its direct competitor for alleged antitrust violations and sought injunctive relief. Defendants moved to compel arbitration,...

Third Circuit Affirms Narrow Definition of Autodialer Under the TCPA

by Caroline E. Oks

Posted in Class Action Defense

On July 3, 2018

In a precedential decision, the Third Circuit affirmed a narrow reading of autodialer under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), the first such decision within this Circuit following the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of the FCC’s 2015 definition of autodialer in ACA International. In Dominguez v. Yahoo, Inc., plaintiff purchased a cell phone with a reassigned telephone number, the prior owner of which had subscribed to Yahoo’s Email SMS Service. Because the prior owner of the number never cancelled the subscription, plaintiff received a text message from Yahoo every time the prior owner received an email, which amounted to thousands of text messages. Plaintiff filed a putative class action alleging that Yahoo had violated the TCPA, which requires that plaintiff prove that Yahoo’s Email SMS Service was an “automatic telephone dialing system,” i.e., an autodialer. Following the FCC’s 2015 ruling, plaintiff amended his complaint to allege that the Email SMS Service “ha[d] the potential capacity to place autodialed calls.” Yahoo moved for summary judgment, and both parties submitted expert reports addressing the Email SMS Service’s latent or potential capacity. The District Court granted Yahoo’s motion to exclude plaintiff’s expert reports and granted summary judgment in favor of Yahoo. On appeal, the Third Circuit relied heavily on ACA International and held that it was required to interpret...

“Private” Facebook Posts Are Discoverable and Should Be Treated as Any Other Source of Discoverable Information

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in E-Discovery: Legal Decisions and Court Rules / Litigation Preparedness and Strategies

On July 3, 2018

The New York Court of Appeals unanimously ruled in Forman v. Henkin that “private” Facebook posts (i.e., those accessible only to your Facebook “friends,” as opposed to the general public) are discoverable if they meet the common discovery standard—that they are “material and necessary to the prosecution or defense of an action.” In Forman, plaintiff alleged she was severely injured when she fell from defendant’s horse. Plaintiff alleged her injuries impaired her ability to communicate and participate in what she described as the active lifestyle she enjoyed before the accident. Plaintiff alleged she posted on Facebook many photographs that depicted her pre-accident lifestyle, but that communicating on that social media platform had become so difficult after the accident that she deactivated the account six months later. She alleged that, after her accident, it would take hours to write a message on Facebook because she would have to re-read it several times before sending it to be sure that it made sense. Defendant requested an unlimited authorization to obtain plaintiff’s “private” Facebook account postings, arguing they would be relevant to plaintiff’s claims. The Supreme Court ordered plaintiff to produce all photographs (that were not of a romantic or sexual nature) and an authorization that would allow defendant to obtain from Facebook the frequency of plaintiff’s Facebook posts,...

Supreme Court Limits American Pipe Tolling, Holds Tolling Does Not Apply to Successive Class Actions

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Class Action Defense

On July 2, 2018

The Supreme Court has acted to ensure that the class action device cannot be used to indefinitely extend the statute of limitations, holding in China Agritech, Inc. v. Resh that American Pipe tolling does not apply to successive class actions. American Pipe tolling dates to 1974, when the Supreme Court held that the filing of a class action tolls the statute of limitations for absent class members who seek to intervene after the court has denied class certification. Nine years later, in Crown, Cork & Seal, the Supreme Court extended the rule to toll the statute of limitations for absent class members who choose to file their own individual actions. Resolving a split amongst the Circuits, the Supreme Court held that American Pipe tolling does not apply where class certification is denied and a class member subsequently seeks to bring a new class action after the expiration of the statute of limitations. The Court opined that the “efficiency and economy of litigation” that underpin the American Pipe rule do not support tolling for successive class actions. Rather, the Court determined, barring tolling in such situations will promote efficiency by requiring all litigants who wish to act as class representatives to come forward early on so that the Court can select the best representative among them. Moreover,...

New Jersey Appellate Division Continues to Hold Sky-High Bar for Arbitration Clauses

by Caroline E. Oks

Posted in General Litigation

On June 29, 2018

In determining the enforceability of arbitration agreements, the New Jersey Appellate Division recently considered the interplay of the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2017 decision in Kindred Nursing Ctrs. v. Clark and the New Jersey Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Atalese v. U.S. Legal Services Grp., L.P. In Defina v. Go Ahead and Jump 1, the Appellate Division held that Kindred Nursing did not abrogate the holding in Atalese. In Defina, the plaintiff, a minor, broke his ankle while playing trampoline dodgeball at Defendant’s facility. Plaintiff’s father had signed a document entitled “Participation Agreement, Release, and Assumption of Risk,” which contained the following arbitration provision: If there are any disputes regarding this agreement, I on behalf of myself and/or my child(ren) hereby waive any right I and/or my child(ren) may have to a trial and agree that such dispute shall be brought within one year of the date of this Agreement and will be determined by binding arbitration before one arbitrator to be administered by JAMS pursuant to its Comprehensive Arbitration Rules and Procedures. . . . Plaintiffs sued, and the trial court granted Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration. On appeal, the Appellate Division reversed, holding that “the arbitration clause at issue in this matter did not clearly and unambiguously inform plaintiff that he was giving up his right...

Supreme Court Expands the Scope of Damages to Include Foreign Sales

by Gibbons P.C.

Posted in Patent

On June 28, 2018

The Supreme Court in WesternGeco LLC v. ION Geophysical Corp. opened a new door to recover for patent damages in its holding that a patent owner can recover damages for patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. §271(f)(2) and §284 of lost foreign profits. The Patent Act outlines several ways an alleged infringer may be liable for patent infringement, including §271(f) which “expands the definition of infringement to include supplying from the United States a patented invention’s components.” 35 U.S.C. §284 authorizes “damages adequate to compensate for the infringement, but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the infringer.” In this case, WesternGeco developed technology for surveying the ocean floor for oil and gas companies. ION Geophysical Corp. sold a competing system where the components were manufactured in the United States and shipped abroad. The Southern District of Texas found that ION Geophysical Corporation infringed WesternGeco’s patents, and that WesternGeco lost specific contracts due to ION’s infringement. The district court awarded $93.4 million in lost profits and $12.5 million in royalties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the award of lost-profit damages following its precedent in Power Integrations, Inc. v. Fairchild Semiconductor Int’l, Inc., 711 F. 3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) which held that...

Delaware Chancery Court Rejects Appraisal Rights for Stockholders Who Relinquish Control of their Corporation Through Merger Involving a Special Merger Subsidiary

by Christopher Walsh

Posted in General Litigation

On June 28, 2018

Delaware law generally grants appraisal rights to shareholders of corporations involved in statutory mergers or consolidations. But, what are the rights of shareholders when control of their corporation is relinquished through a merger between a specially-created merger subsidiary and another corporation? According to Chancellor Bouchard’s recent opinion, the shareholders have no appraisal rights because they do not own shares in a “constituent corporation in the merger.” Chancellor Bouchard also found that the shareholders are not entitled to appraisal rights because they will retain their shares in the parent corporation in the contemplated transaction. Dr. Pepper Snapple Group, Inc., a publicly-traded corporation, and Keurig Green Mountain, Inc., a privately-held corporation, wanted to combine their businesses. They therefore agreed to a so-called reverse triangular merger, pursuant to which (1) Dr. Pepper will create a new subsidiary, (2) that subsidiary will be merged into Keurig’s owner, Maple Parent Holdings Corp., and (3) Maple Parent will become a wholly-owned subsidiary of Dr. Pepper. In addition, Maple Parent will pay a $9 billion dividend to Dr. Pepper and receive enough shares in Dr. Pepper to give it a controlling 87% share of Dr. Pepper’s common stock. Maple Parent’s $9 billion payment to Dr. Pepper will then be used to help finance special cash dividends of $103.75 per share to Dr....