Gibbons Law Alert
At the Fifth Annual Gibbons Employment & Labor Law Conference for clients of the firm, we presented a program entitled “Wellness Programs for a Healthy Workplace.” Cathy Kenworthy, President and CEO of Interactive Health, discussed the business case for implementing wellness programs in our workplaces, while I addressed the numerous laws impacting such programs.
On March 9, 2016, the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) proposed a new definition of an “underutilized” site for purposes of claiming tangible property tax credits for sites in New York City under the New York State Brownfield Cleanup Program (BCP). As noted in prior blogs, the 2015 amendments to the BCP established new restrictions on the ability of sites in the five boroughs of New York City to obtain tax credits related to expenditures for site improvements. One of the criteria which would allow a site to qualify for such credits was that the site be “underutilized.” That term was left undefined by the Legislature, with instructions to NYSDEC to finalize a definition by October 1, 2015.
In 2005, the Federal Circuit established the framework for the construction of patent claim terms. In its landmark holding in Philips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit stated that “words of a claim ‘are generally given their ordinary and customary meaning . . . [and] that the ordinary and customary meaning of a claim term is the meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art . . . .”
The Delaware Supreme Court, in Marc Hazout v. Tsang Mun Ting, No. 353, 2015 (Feb. 26, 2016) (Strine, C.J.), held that the reach of personal jurisdiction under 10 Del. C. § 3114 over nonresident officers and directors of Delaware corporations, contrary to Court of Chancery precedent, is not limited to claims by stockholders against such officers and directors for breach of fiduciary duty. Rather, under the plain language of the statute, a nonresident officer or director of a Delaware corporation, by virtue of accepting and holding office, has consented to personal jurisdiction in Delaware, subject to the requirements of due process, in two classes of cases: (i) “all civil actions or proceedings brought in this State, by or on behalf of, or against such corporation, in which such officer [or director] is a necessary or proper party”; or (ii) “any action or proceeding against such officer [or director] in violation of a duty in such capacity.”
In two related opinions (Docket Nos. 2015–1361, 2015–1369, 2015–1366, 2015–1368 and Docket No. 2015-1364) issued February 22, 2016 (each captioned PPC Broadband, Inc. v. Corning Optical Communications RF, LLC), the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) vacated and remanded portions of decisions rendered by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”) of the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office (“USPTO”) in five separate inter partes review proceedings initiated by Corning Optical Communications RF, LLC (“Corning”) against PPC Broadband, Inc. (“PPC”). PPC is the owner of three patents at issue in the inter partes review proceedings (US 8,287,320, US 8,323,060, and US 8,313,353). The patents are related and directed to features of a coaxial cable connector. The CAFC decisions focus primarily on claim construction issues relating to the application of the PTAB’s “broadest reasonable construction” (“BRC”) claim construction standard and illustrate how the Court may evaluate the reasonableness of claim constructions in PTAB decisions on appeal.
Anyone reading recent headlines knows that Apple, Inc. is engaged in a legal, and ultimately political, struggle with the U.S. Government over access to the cell phone of Syed Rizwan Farook, one of the shooters in the December 2, 2015 terror attack at the Inland Regional Center in San Bernardino, California. The core issue in that California proceeding is whether Apple should be forced to “create and load Apple-signed software onto the subject iPhone device to circumvent the security and anti-tampering features of the device in order to enable the government to hack the passcode to obtain access to the protected data contained therein.”
On February 12, 2016, the en banc Federal Circuit, in a 10-2 decision in Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Impression Prods., Inc., reaffirmed its long-standing rules that: (1) the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to patented articles sold subject to single-use/no-resale restrictions that were communicated to the buyer at the time of sale; and (2) the exhaustion doctrine does not apply to the sale of patented goods outside of the U.S.
A federal district court in the Northern District of California has recently given litigants in trademark counterfeiting cases guidance on where wrongful seizure claims under the ex parte provisions of the Lanham Act may be brought. The court ruled in United Tactical Systems, LLC v. Real Action Paintball, Inc. that wrongful seizure claims may be brought in any federal court, and not just the court that ordered the seizure. The case should be watched by accused infringers who have been the target of an ex parte seizure under the Lanham Act.
The use of “and/or” in drafting or, for that matter, anything other than the most casual communications, is one of our pet peeves. It is a substitute for careful drafting and an invitation to ambiguity. Ken Adams, in his Manual of Style for Contract Drafting – which we highly recommend to any serious drafter – devotes two pages to using, or perhaps, better said, mis-using, “and/or.” Mr. Adams observes that since the mid-20th century, judges and legal-writing commentators have railed against the use of “and/or” to convey the meaning of the inclusive “or.”
In perhaps the first published decision since the amended Federal Rules took effect on December 6, 2015, United States Magistrate Judge James C. Francis IV, a preeminent judicial e-discovery authority, relied upon amended Rule 37(e) and, somewhat controversially, his inherent authority, to sanction a litigant for evidence tampering and spoliation. The opinion is significant, not solely because it invokes the newly-minted rule, but because it interprets amended Rule 37(e) as not foreclosing the court’s inherent authority as a viable alternative to sanction spoliation-related conduct that may not strictly satisfy the new Rule’s elements.