Gibbons Law Alert

Gibbons Law Alert

Tagged: Appeal

Wrap-Up of United States Supreme Court’s 2017-2018 Term

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Posted in General Litigation

On July 11, 2018

With the close of the United States Supreme Court’s 2017-18 term, we offer this wrap-up, focusing on decisions of special interest from the business and commercial perspective (excluding patent cases): In a much talked-about decision in the antitrust field, the Court held in Ohio v. American Express Co. that American Express’s anti-steering provisions in its merchant contracts, which generally preclude merchants from encouraging customers to use credit cards other than American Express, are not anticompetitive and therefore do not violate Section 1 of the Sherman Act. In so holding, the Court found that credit card networks are two-sided transaction platforms, one side being the merchant and the other side being the merchant’s customer. Thus, when assessing whether the anti-steering agreements are anticompetitive, the effects on both sides of the platform must be considered. The plaintiffs’ proof that American Express had increased its merchant fees over a period of time was insufficient to show an anticompetitive effect because it neglected the customer side of the platform, where consumers have received the benefit of ever-increasing rewards from credit card companies and other improvements in services that those higher merchant fees enable. Bringing an end to a fight that New Jersey had been waging against the NCAA and professional sports leagues since 2012, the Court paved the way for...

Third Circuit Holds Anti-Assignment Clauses in ERISA Plans Are Enforceable

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Posted in General Litigation

On June 27, 2018

The Third Circuit, in a decision that may limit the remedies available to medical providers in the event of non-payment, recently clarified that “anti-assignment clauses in ERISA-governed health insurance plans as a general matter are enforceable.” In so holding, the Third Circuit joins all other circuit courts that have addressed the issue. On the basis of that clause, the Court held that the plaintiff out-of-network health care provider seeking reimbursement for a participant’s medical claims lacked standing to pursue the claim against the insurers on the participant’s behalf. In October 2015, the plaintiff provider performed shoulder surgery on a patient who was covered by an ERISA-governed health-insurance plan. In billing the individual for the procedure, the provider – because it was not part of the plan’s provider network – charged amounts that far exceeded the plan’s reimbursement limits for the surgery. The plan’s insurers applied its out-of-network limit in processing the claim and reimbursed only a fraction of the total amount charged. The provider appealed the claim on the patient’s behalf. At the same time, the provider had the patient sign an assignment-of-benefits form which assigned to the provider the patient’s right to pursue claims under his health-insurance plan for the surgery. The insurers denied the appeal, and the provider sued alleging ERISA violations. The insurers...

Access Denied: NJ Appellate Division Clarifies Shareholder’s Right to Inspection of Corporate Records

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Posted in General Litigation

On June 25, 2018

In R.A. Feuer v. Merck & Co., Inc., the New Jersey Appellate Division, in a to-be-published opinion, narrowly construed the scope of a shareholder’s right to inspect a corporation’s records under N.J.S.A. 14A:5-28 and the common law. A Merck & Co, Inc. shareholder appealed from the dismissal of his complaint seeking various corporate records, including twelve broad categories of documents. The shareholder sought evidence that Merck acted wrongfully in its acquisition of another pharmaceutical firm. After Merck appointed a working group to assess the shareholder’s concerns, the shareholder requested documents pertaining generally to the working group’s activities, communications, and formation; documents provided to the board regarding the target pharmaceutical firm and two of its drugs; and the board’s considerations of the shareholder’s demands and the working group’s recommendation. Merck disclosed pertinent minutes of the board and of the working group, but denied the remainder of the shareholder’s demand. The trial court determined that the shareholder’s demand exceeded the scope of the “books and records of account, minutes, and record of shareholders,” which the shareholder had a statutory right to inspect and that the common law did not expand that statutory right. The Appellate Division affirmed, narrowly construing the plain language of N.J.S.A. 14A:5-28(4). According to the court, “minutes” refers to “shareholder, board, and executive committee...

Third Circuit Affirms the Dismissal of a Putative Class Action against TD Bank for Failure to Meet Pleading Requirements

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On June 18, 2018

Last month, the Third Circuit upheld the dismissal of a putative class action against TD Bank, finding that plaintiffs’ conclusory allegations lacked sufficient evidence and failed to satisfy Rule 9(b)’s heightened pleading standard for claims that sound in fraud. In MZL Capital Holdings, Inc. et al. v. TD Bank, N.A. et al., two account holders with TD Bank filed a proposed class action accusing the Bank of obscuring its exchange rates and improperly charging an embedded fee for converting foreign currency, thereby defrauding its customers in violation of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act. Shortly thereafter, plaintiffs amended their complaint to add claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation of numerous other state consumer-protection laws. TD Bank moved to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims for failure to state a claim, and the District Court granted TD Bank’s motion, dismissing all of plaintiffs’ claims. On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision, concluding that plaintiffs’ claims were inadequately pled. At the outset, the Court re-affirmed the basic principle that claims brought under the Consumer Fraud Act sound in fraud and therefore must comply with Rule 9(b)’s particularity requirement. The Third Circuit held that plaintiffs’ general allegations, which failed to identify any provision in their agreement...

Third Circuit Holds Agreement to Arbitrate in Illusory Forum Is Unenforceable

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On June 11, 2018

The Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently held, in a precedential decision, that when parties enter an agreement directing them to arbitrate in an illusory forum, the forum selection clause is not severable and the entire agreement to arbitrate is unenforceable. In MacDonald v. CashCall, Inc. et al., a plaintiff brought suit on behalf of himself and a putative class, alleging a loan agreement between the parties was unconscionable and usurious. The agreement at issue included “(1) a provision requiring that all disputes be resolved through arbitration conducted by a representative of the Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe (‘CRST’) and (2) a clause that delegates questions about the arbitration provision’s enforceability to the arbitrator.” The defendants moved to compel arbitration. The district court declined to compel arbitration because the agreement at issue expressly disavowed federal and state law, thus rendering the arbitration provisions invalid as an impermissible prospective waiver of federal and state statutory rights. The district court further held that the arbitration agreement was unenforceable because the forum was illusory, as the selected forum did not conduct arbitrations or have rules for conducting arbitrations. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court’s conclusion that the loan agreement’s arbitration provision cannot direct arbitration to an illusory forum—here, the CRST. Similar to its sister circuits, the Third Circuit...

In Defective Shingles Class Action, Third Circuit Rejects Novel “Expected Useful Life” Defect Theory Premised on Warranty Period

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On June 8, 2018

The Third Circuit recently confirmed that plaintiffs must provide evidence of a specific defect, capable of classwide proof, in order to prevail on proposed class claims, holding that, where defective design is “an essential element of Plaintiffs’ misrepresentation-based claims,” whether proof of the defect “is susceptible to classwide evidence is dispositive of whether Plaintiffs can satisfy predominance” under Rule 23(b)(3). In Gonzalez v. Owens Corning, the plaintiffs sued the manufacturer of Oakridge fiberglass roofing shingles, claiming that their shingles, which were subject to warranties of 25 years or more, were “plagued by design flaws that result in cracking, curling and degranulation” and “will eventually fail.” The plaintiffs argued that the product warranties amounted to representations about the shingles’ expected useful life. Plaintiffs did not dispute that the design specifications for all shingles met the applicable industry design standard (“ASTM”), but claimed that compliance with the ASTM specifications did not consistently yield shingles that would last the stated warranty period. Thus, plaintiffs claimed that the issue of “defectiveness should be judged by the expected useful life of the shingles as represented by the applicable warranty period.” The plaintiffs’ expert, whose testimony was largely stricken as unreliable under Daubert, acknowledged that there was no single set of measurements applicable to all shingles that would constitute a design...

No Harm to Competition: Third Circuit Upholds Decision for Uber in Antitrust Challenge by Philadelphia Taxicab Drivers

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Posted in Antitrust

On April 9, 2018

The Third Circuit’s newly-issued precedential opinion in Philadelphia Taxi Association v. Uber Technologies, Inc. is a classic reminder that the antitrust laws protect against harm to competition – not harm to competitors. In 2016, a group of Philadelphia taxicab drivers sued Uber in federal district court, alleging that the ride-sharing service was unlawfully attempting to monopolize the vehicle-for-hire market in Philadelphia. Plaintiffs pointed to the fact that, in October 2014, just prior to Uber’s entry into Philadelphia, there were 7,000 taxi drivers, and each of the city’s 1,610 taxicab medallions was valued at an average of $545,000. Two years later, 1,200 medallion taxi drivers had fled to Uber, those still driving taxis saw a thirty percent decline in their earnings, and the value of a medallion plummeted to just $80,000. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs had not pled antitrust injury – i.e., harm that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent – and thus did not have antitrust standing to maintain their suit. This appeal followed. The Third Circuit affirmed the dismissal but, unlike the district court, did so first based on plaintiffs’ failure to plausibly allege the elements of their attempted monopolization claim – i.e., that Uber (1) engaged in anticompetitive conduct with a (2) specific intent to monopolize and...

D.C. Circuit’s Rejection of FCC’s 2015 “Autodialer” Definition is Welcome News for Businesses in TCPA Class Actions

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On March 23, 2018

On March 16, 2018, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals issued a long awaited decision in its review of the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order, which among other things, had sought to clarify various aspects of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act’s (TCPA) general bar against using automated dialing devices (ATDS) to make uninvited calls or texts messages. The FCC’s 2015 Order was largely viewed by businesses as having greatly expanded the scope of the TCPA, opening the floodgates of class action litigation against businesses utilizing virtually any type of text messaging to communicate ads to customers. In ACA International v. FCC, the D.C. Circuit, among other things, struck down the Commission’s broad definition of autodialer. The TCPA generally makes it unlawful to call a cell phone using an ATDS, i.e., “equipment which has the capacity-(A) to store or produce telephone numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator; and (B) to dial such numbers.” Id. § 227(a)(1). The FCC’s 2015 Order declined to define a device’s “capacity” in a manner confined to its “present capacity,” but rather, construed a device’s “capacity” to encompass its “potential functionalities” with modifications such as software changes. Thus, under the Commission’s 2015 interpretation, calls or texts made with a device having the capacity...

Wide of the Goal: Second Circuit Says No to Soccer League’s Request for Preliminary Injunction in Antitrust Suit

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Posted in Antitrust

On March 1, 2018

Coming, coincidentally, just days before the start of the 2018 Major League Soccer season, the recent Second Circuit decision in North American Soccer League, LLC v. United States Soccer Federation, Inc. has key takeaways for antitrust and injunction law practitioners. As the governing body for soccer in the U.S. and Canada, the United States Soccer Federation (U.S. Soccer) promulgates Standards, tied to the number and location of a league’s teams, that it uses to designate leagues as Division I, II, or III each year. Major League Soccer (MLS) has been the only D-I men’s soccer league since it began play in 1995, while the North American Soccer League (NASL), despite aspirations to compete directly against MLS, has operated since 2011 as a D-II league. Last year, U.S. Soccer rejected NASL’s application for a D-II designation for the 2018 season. Rather than filing instead for D-III status, NASL sued U.S. Soccer in federal court in Brooklyn, alleging that U.S. Soccer violates Section 1 of the Sherman Antitrust Act by selectively applying its Standards to restrain competition among top-tier U.S. men’s professional soccer leagues. As part of its lawsuit, NASL sought a preliminary injunction requiring U.S. Soccer to grant it D-II status for 2018. Because NASL wanted a D-II designation without going through the usual application process, the...

Ninth Circuit Reverses $200 Million Settlement and Class Certification For Lack of Proper Choice of Law Analysis

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Posted in Class Action Defense

On February 14, 2018

In a decision that may make it harder to settle cases on behalf of nationwide classes, the Ninth Circuit recently overturned a $200 million class action settlement and vacated the certification of a nationwide class of consumers, finding the district court failed to examine whether different states’ laws applied to the class members’ claims and whether Rule 23’s predominance requirement was satisfied. The dispute was rooted in a 2012 investigation which found that Hyundai and Kia deviated from U.S. Environmental Protection Agency fuel economy testing protocols and overstated the fuel efficiency estimates in advertisements and car window stickers for certain 2011, 2012, and 2013 vehicles. A California federal court approved the settlement in June 2015. However, in In re Hyundai and Kia Fuel Economy Litigation, a split three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit vacated the District Court’s approval order and certification of a nationwide class of consumers. Five objectors appealed from the class settlement arguing, among other things, that the settlement violated consumer rights in states other than California. The Ninth Circuit held that the District Court erred by failing to apply California’s choice of law rules to determine whether California law could apply to all plaintiffs in a nationwide class or, alternatively, if the court had to apply the law of each state. According to...

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