Tagged: Patent Litigation
As the so-called pay for-delay case is ripening for Supreme Court oral argument on March 25, 2013, on Tuesday a bi-partisan group of senators introduced legislation meant to strongly deter such arrangements. The introduction of the bill, known as the “Preserve Access to Affordable Generics Act,” follows an annual FTC report disclosing 40 potential pay-for-delay deals struck in the 2012 fiscal year — a jump from 28 such deals in 2011. The goal of the bill is “to prohibit brand name drug companies from compensating generic drug companies to delay the entry of a generic drug into the market.” Such reverse payments (payments made by branded pharmaceutical patent holders to generic challengers to postpone market entry) are considered lawful by some, and anti-competitive by others, including the FTC.
Discovery of computer source code–either through production, inspection, or deposition–is one of the more contentious aspects of patent litigation. Indeed, “few tasks excite a defendant less . . . . Engineers and management howl at the notion of providing strangers, and especially a fierce competitor, access to the crown jewels. Counsel struggle to understand even exactly what code exists and exactly how it can be made available for reasonable inspection. All sorts of questions are immediately posed. . . . Put simply, source code production is disruptive, expensive, and fraught with monumental opportunities to screw up.” Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 11-1846, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62971, *10-11 (N.D. Cal. May 4, 2012) (ECF No. 898).
The America Invents Act (AIA), created a transitional program for post-grant review of certain patents claiming subject matter referred to as covered business methods (“CBM”). As defined by AIA § 18(d)(1) and 37 C.F.R. § 42.301, a CBM is “a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or service.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.301 does, however, provide an exception for technological inventions. Whether a claim recites a technical feature is determined based on whether the claim is “novel and unobvious over the prior art; and [whether the claim] solves a technical problem using a technical solution.” Id.
On Monday, the Supreme Court denied Rates Technology Inc.’s petition for writ of certiorari to hear whether a pre-litigation no-challenge provision is void under Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969) as the Second Circuit found. We previously discussed the petition, the Second Circuit’s holding, and the no-challenge clause which prevents a licensee from challenging the validity of a patent.
On Monday, the Supreme Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari filed by Apotex seeking review of the Federal Circuit’s May 7, 2012, ruling that affirmed the District Court of New Jersey’s judgment that Otsuka’s patents covering its blockbuster drug Abilify© are valid and not obvious. In that ruling, the Federal Circuit found no error in the District Court’s application of the so-called lead compound test; an analytical framework in chemical art cases that seeks — in an obviousness inquiry under 35 U.S.C. § 103 — to determine whether a POSA (“person of ordinary skill in the art”) would select the proffered prior art as a “lead compound.” Specifically, in a lead compound analysis, the Court will consider: the hypothetical person of skill in the art’s identification of a lead compound, structural differences between the proposed lead compound and the claimed invention, motivation or teachings in the prior art to make the necessary changes to arrive at the claimed invention, and whether the person of skill in the art would have a reasonable expectation of success in making such structural changes.
Deferring judgment until after he hears testimony prior to trial, U.S. District Judge Richard G. Andrews of the District of Delaware nonetheless indicated in a recent Memorandum Opinion that he was inclined to exclude plaintiff’s patent damages expert. In AVM Techs., LLC v. Intel Corp., C.A. No. 10-610-RGA, plaintiff AVM sued Intel for patent infringement relating to U.S. Patent No. 5,859,547, which claims improved dynamic logic circuits used in microprocessors. Intel filed a Daubert motion seeking to exclude AVM’s damages expert, who had opined that AVM was entitled to reasonable royalty damages of over $150 – $300 million.
Like 2012, 2013 promises to be a busy and significant year for intellectual property law. The Supreme Court is slated to decide a number of IP cases, including: Already, LLC d/b/a Yums v. Nike, Inc. (addressing the significance of a limited covenant-not-to-sue on declaratory judgment jurisdiction); Bowman v. Monsanto (determining whether the Federal Circuit erred by not finding patent exhaustion in second generation seeds and created an exception to patent exhaustion for self-replicating technologies); Gunn v. Minton (pertaining to whether federal courts have exclusive “arising under” jurisdiction when legal malpractice claims stem from a patent case); Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (regarding international copyright exhaustion, i.e., how Section 602(a)(1) and Section 109(a) of the Copyright Act apply to a copy that was legally acquired abroad and then imported into the United States); Federal Trade Comm’n v. Watson Pharm., Inc. (involving whether Hatch-Waxman reverse payment settlement agreements are legal); and most recently, Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, et al. (regarding the patentability of human genes and whether the petitioners have standing to challenge those patents).
Last week, in Gilead Sciences, Inc. v. Natco Pharma Ltd., the District of New Jersey ruled on summary judgment that Gilead Sciences did not unlawfully extend its patent protection on oseltamivir (Tamiflu), a neuraminidase inhibitor used to treat the flu, covered by U.S. Patent No. 5,763,483 (“the ‘483 patent”). Natco Pharma sought to invalidate the ‘483 patent for obviousness-type double patenting in its attempt to market a generic version of Tamiflu prior to the patent’s expiration. Natco had alleged, inter alia, that the claims of the ‘483 patent were invalid due to obviousness-type double-patenting over Gilead’s later issued U.S. Patent No. 5,952,375 (“the ‘375 patent”).
On November 30, 2012, Representative Lamar Smith introduced H.R. 6621 to “correct and improve certain provisions of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act and title 35, United States Code.” The act seeks to provide a number of technical corrections to a variety of issues, including: eliminating a 9 month dead zone for inter partes review allowing inter partes reviews to be filed at any time for applications with an effective filing date before March 16, 2013; extending the time for filing the inventor’s oath or declaration until the payment of the issue fee; eliminating the prohibition on post grant review for reissue patents with narrowing amendments; clarifying the standards for initiating derivation proceedings; clarifying the calculation for patent term adjustment; and repealing 35 USC 373, which restricted the types of inventors or applicants that could file PCT applications at the U.S. Patent Office.
The International Trade Commission (the “ITC”) recently issued its opinion in Certain Lighting Control Devices Including Dimmer Switches and Parts Thereof (IV), Inv. No. 337-TA-776. The ITC opinion addressed whether the complainant had established the facts necessary for a finding of circumvention of a Limited Exclusion Order to justify the issuance of a General Exclusion Order. The ITC ultimately issued the General Exclusion Order sought by the complainant, disagreeing with the findings of the Administrative Law Judge and the recommendation of the Commission Investigative Staff.
