Tagged: Patent

Patent Marking Under the America Invents Act – Virtual Marking

As practitioners know, U.S. patent law provides for the recovery of patent infringement damages for a period of time when an infringer has actual or constructive notice of the infringed patent. Actual notice is provided by way of letter or similar mechanism to the infringer after infringement has begun. Constructive notice can be provided by placing the patent number on the patented product. Such constructive notice provides notice to the infringer of the existence of a patent prior to actual notice, thereby extending the time period for recovering damages up to the date the infringement begins.

CAFC Reverses Inequitable Conduct Finding: Outside The Box Innovations v. Travel Caddy

The Federal Circuit recently reversed the Northern District of Georgia’s judgment of unenforceability based on inequitable conduct, in Outside The Box Innovations, LLC v. Travel Caddy, Inc. Other aspects of the decision are outside the scope of this blog. In reversing, and citing last year’s en banc decision in Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 649 F.3d 1276 (Fed. Cir. 2011), the CAFC reiterated that to establish unenforceability based on inequitable conduct before the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”), a party must prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) information material to patentability was withheld from the PTO, or material misinformation was provided to the PTO, and that such act was done (2) with the intent to deceive or mislead.

FTC Petitions for Certiorari in Reverse Payments Dispute

As we anticipated, the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) filed a petition for certiorari yesterday with the Supreme Court in FTC v. Watson Pharmaceuticals, Inc. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit upheld reverse payments (payments made by branded pharmaceutical patent holders to generic challengers to postpone market entry under the scope-of-the-patent approach, i.e., as long as the anti-competitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential of the patent, absent sham litigation or fraud), as lawful. The Second and Federal Circuits follow that approach. In contrast, the Third Circuit has held that such payments are presumptively anti-competitive under the “quick look rule of reason analysis” that may be rebutted by showing that the payments was for something other than delay or that the payment has a competitive benefit, and thereby increases competition.

New Derivation Rule — 37 C.F.R. Part 42

The PTO recently announced final rules regarding the new derivation proceedings, 37 C.F.R. Part 42, pursuant to the Smith-Leahy America Invents Act. As practitioners are well aware, the AIA will transform the U.S. from a first-to-invent to a first-to-file patent system on March 16, 2013, aligning the U.S. with the European and Japanese systems. For all applications filed on or after March 16, 2013, under the first-to-file system, interference proceedings, which are used to determine “which [of two] part[ies] first invented [a] commonly claimed invention,” will become obsolete. Derivation proceedings will in part replace current interference practice, but will likely be applicable in a much narrower set of circumstances.

Will the Supreme Court Weigh in on Reverse Payments in ANDA Cases — Revisited

We have written previously on numerous developments concerning reverse payments in Hatch-Waxman litigation settlements (i.e., payments made by branded pharmaceutical patent holders to generic challengers to postpone market entry of proposed generic products). Earlier this month, we reported that Merck & Co. had filed a petition for a Writ of Certiorari seeking to challenge the Third Circuit’s decision in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig. holding that reverse payments are prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation.

Inter Partes Review Under AIA is Underway …

As we previously discussed, the new inter partes review (IPR) procedures went into effect September 16, 2012, along with several other significant changes. The IPR procedure replaces the previous inter partes reexamination and applies to any patent issued before, during, or after September 16, 2012. This removes one of the hurdles of the previous inter partes reexamination which applied only to applications filed after November 29, 1999. The PTO will only accept a valid IPR petition nine months after a patent issues. As in inter partes reexamination, the IPR permits the petitioner to challenge claims as being anticipated or obvious in view of published prior art references. Also, like the previous inter partes reexamination, IPR carries with it an estoppel effect barring the IPR petitioner from asserting the invalidity of any challenged claim on the same arguments and references in any district court action.

Akamai and McKesson: Inducement Liability for Infringement by Multiple Actors

In August, we reported that a decision in the en banc Federal Circuit rehearings of Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 629 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2010) and McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp. , 98 U.S.P.Q.2d 1281 (Fed. Cir. 2011) appeared to be imminent. As predicted, on August 31, 2012, the Federal Circuit issued an en banc, per curiam opinion deciding both cases.

Will the Supreme Court Weigh in on Reverse Payments in ANDA Cases?

We previously reported on developments in various United States Courts of Appeal decisions concerning reverse payments in Hatch-Waxman litigation settlements – that is, payments made by branded pharmaceutical patent holders to generic challengers to postpone market entry of the generic product. Most recently, as we reported here, the Third Circuit in In re K-Dur Antitrust Litig. bucked prior holdings of the Eleventh, Second, and Federal Circuits, ruling that a reverse payment is prima facie evidence of an antitrust violation and, therefore, serves as evidence of unreasonable restraints of trade. In light of the Third Circuit’s divergent decision from other circuit precedent, many predicted a subsequent Petition for Certiorari.

Norman IP v. Lexmark: Post AIA Joinder and the Rule 42 Trump Card

In Norman IP Holdings, LLC v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., a recent Eastern District of Texas decision, Chief District Judge Leonard Davis provided guidance on the application of Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 (“Rule 20”) joinder and Fed. R. Civ. P. 42 (“Rule 42”) consolidation in patent infringement cases post-enactment of the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). Norman IP brought suit against Lexmark and others on September 15, 2011, one day before the AIA was signed into law. Norman IP later added an additional 23 defendants. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss for improper joinder or to sever, and Norman IP alternatively requested that any severed cases be consolidated under Rule 42. The Court granted defendants’ motion to sever and issued an order consolidating the cases for pretrial issues excluding venue.

Already v. Nike: Petitioner’s Brief Asserts that Jurisdiction Remains Despite Covenant Not to Sue

In a prior blog, we reported that the Supreme Court had granted certiorari in Already, LLC dba Yums v. Nike, Inc., No. 11-982, to an appeal from the Second Circuit’s decision affirming the Southern District of New York’s holding that a covenant not to sue entered in a trademark dispute ended the case and controversy between the parties.